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A New Emergency Law Model for Egypt
By Michelle A. Liguori*

A

Introduction

state of emergency expired shows that its raison d’être was to
bring about a return to the normal constitutional order.12

mong the demands of protesters who brought about
the resignation of former president Hosni Mubarak in
February 2011 was the lifting of the state of emergency
that was in place in Egypt throughout Mubarak’s nearly 30-year
presidency and an end to abuses that occurred pursuant to
the country’s 53-year-old emergency
law.1 Throughout most of the ensuing
military-led transition, the state of
emergency and the 1958 Emergency
Law remained, at least partially, in
place,2 and human rights groups
reported continued abuses.3 The state
of emergency expired in May 2012,
though the 1958 Emergency Law has
not been repealed.4

The Ancient Roman model has been resurrected in modern
times such that many modern constitutions, including those
of France, Turkey, South Africa, and Afghanistan, authorize
states of emergency. In fact, international law authorizes
countries to derogate from
their treaty obligations, if
faced with a “public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation,” provided
that the emergency is officially declared.13 However,
it designates certain rights
non-derogable, even during an emergency, including, inter alia, the right not
to be discriminated against
solely on the grounds of
race, color, sex, language,
religion or social origin;
the right to life; the right
to be free from torture and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to be
convicted under retroactive criminal laws or to receive a more
severe retroactive sentence; and the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion.14

“… differences of opinion
exist as to the optimal
system modern democratic
states should use to deal
with emergencies, with most
scholars falling into one of
three camps.”

A constituent assembly is currently
in the process of drafting a new constitution for Egypt,5 while protesters and
politicians have continued to call for
changes to the country’s emergency
powers.6 Taking into account Egypt’s
history and the types of emergencies
the country is most likely to face in the
near future, this paper proposes a new
emergency law model that could be
incorporated into Egypt’s new constitution.
heories of

Emergency Powers

Nonetheless, differences of opinion exist as to the optimal
system modern democratic states should use to deal with emergencies, with most scholars falling into one of three camps.

Modern emergency powers have their origin in Ancient
7
Roman
T law. The Roman Constitution provided for the Senate
(legislative branch) to declare a state of emergency for a period
of up to six months, during which executive authority would be
transferred from the Consuls (executive branch) to a dictator,
appointed by the Consuls.8 The dictator was chosen from among
men outside the ordinary governmental apparatus known for
their skill and virtue.9 The purpose of such powers was to enable
the dictator to eliminate extraordinary threats to the Republic by
authorizing him to take extraordinary actions for the duration of
the emergency.10 However, once the threat was eliminated, the
dictator would step aside and the republican form of government,
with the Consuls as executives, would resume unaltered.11The
fact that the ordinary system of government returned when the

The first camp advocates what is sometimes referred to as
the neo-Roman model.15 Its theoretical basis was articulated,
in modern times, by the controversial German political theorist Carl Schmitt.16 Schmitt argued that the rule of law has no
place during an emergency and that an emergency, by its nature,
requires the suspension of democratic constitutional order.17
Many scholars and politicians, however, have recognized that
constitutionalized emergency powers run the risk that government will resort to such powers more often than is necessary,
jeopardizing the rule of law and the constitutional order, itself.18
Critics of the neo-Roman model can point to, inter alia, the fall
of the Weimar Republic to Nazi dictatorship after the former
declared several states of emergency19 and the use of emergency
measures to silence political opposition in Egypt during its prolonged state of emergency.20

* Michelle A. Liguori is a graduate of Harvard Law School. She has
served as an intern at UNESCO and the Public International Law
and Policy Group in Cairo and will be a Fulbright Fellow in Egypt
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However, the notion that emergencies require
extraordinary measures that are outside the normal
legal system and that it is best to provide a prescribed,
limited, and temporary set of emergency measures to
be used to deal with such emergencies continues to be
embraced by many.21 The advantage of such a model
is that, at the end of the emergency, the normal constitutional system can be restored intact.
Countries using the neo-Roman model often
adopt a number of safeguards to prevent overuse of
constitutional emergency powers by giving authority
over different aspects of the powers to different branches
of the government.22 In practice, emergency laws
vary in the branch that has responsibility for: declaring the state of emergency (usually the executive23),
enacting emergency measures (usually the executive),
executing emergency measures (usually the executive),
extending and/or terminating the state of emergency
(usually the legislature), and reviewing actions taken
in response to the emergency (usually the judiciary, if Photo courtesy of Jonathan Rashad.
any). Some countries spell out certain rights, usually
The danger with the legality model is that actions taken in
those identified as non-derogable under international
response
to an emergency will permanently transform the constilaw, that may not be restricted in order to deal with the emer24
tutional
system
in a less rights-protective manner.34 A number of
gency. Many countries also provide in their constitutions or
scholars
have
expressed
this concern about legislation passed in
supplementary legislation that emergency measures expire once
25
the
United
States
after
the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the state of emergency is terminated.
some of whom have proposed a new model of emergency powers.35
The second camp is uncomfortable with creating a secondary
The third camp, sometimes called the “extra-legal measures
legal system to be used during times of emergency, on the
model,”36 is skeptical both of prescribed emergency powers and
grounds that authorizing periods during which the government
of relying on courts to serve as a check on extraordinary meais not subject to normal checks and balances presents too great a
sures on the grounds that both threaten to constitutionalize the
threat to the rule of law. The United States is, to some extent, an
exception. Adherents of this view believe that political, rather
example of this second model, sometimes called the “legality”
than judicial, checks on the executive are the best way to prevent
model.26
executive overreaching through emergency actions. 37
A prominent adherent of the legality model is David
Oren Gross, a member of this camp, proposes a constitution
Dyzenhaus. Dyzenhaus accepts that the executive will have to
that
authorizes the executive to take whatever actions he or she
take decisive action during an emergency, but he calls on the
deems
necessary to deal with an emergency situation, provided
legislature and judiciary to ensure that the response to the emer27
that,
after
they go into effect, the executive’s actions will be
gency is not outside the rule of law. Dyzenhaus argues that
put
up
for
a
popular referendum, either directly or through the
the courts, in particular, should scrutinize executive emergency
28
people’s
legislative
representatives. 38 If the people determine
actions, whereas scholars such as Posner and Vermeule argue
that
the
actions
cannot
be supported by the constitution, they can
that courts are ill-equipped to determine appropriate responses
subject
the
executive
to
legal and/or political sanction.39 As with
to emergency situations and should defer to the executive, at
29
the
legality
model,
for
the
extra-legal measures model, with its
least during the heat of the emergency.
reliance on a political check, to work, the people, or at least their
In fact, most advanced democracies, even those whose
representatives in Gross’ model, must have a firm commitment
constitutions follow the neo-Roman model, rarely declare states
to the rule of law.40
of emergency in response to threats to their national security.30 Because of the rule of law concerns raised by states of
History of Emergency Powers in Egypt
emergency, such countries tend to use ordinary legislation that
delegates exceptional powers to the executive branch; however,
The emergency powers in Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, as
this legislation does not suspend the constitutional order and
amended, which governed the country until March 2011, largely
is subject to judicial review, like ordinary legislation.31 Along
followed the neo-Roman model. Article 148 gave the president
these lines, Dyzenhaus emphasizes that for the legality model to
authority to declare a state of emergency.41 Article 148 further
work, all branches of government, and the general public, must
provided that the state of emergency would last 15 days, after
have a firm commitment to the rule of law.32 Others have noted
which approval by the legislature was required.42 The Article did
that it also requires a legislature capable of quickly agreeing on
not specify a time limit for the state of emergency, other than
legislation authorizing the executive to take decisive action.33
to say that it would be limited, and that any extension required
legislative approval.43 The state of emergency is further regulated by Law No. 162 of 1958 (which has not been repealed),
11
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“Human rights watch groups recorded systematic human
rights abuses by Mubarak’s government, under the guise of
emergency measures. Not surprisingly, lifting of the state
of emergency and revocation of the 1958 Emergency Law
were among the demands of anti-government protesters that
ultimately brought about the fall of the Mubarak regime.”
which, inter alia, authorizes the president to restrict freedom of
assembly, detain suspects for up to six months without a hearing,
and conduct searches without a warrant during a state of
emergency.44

issued a Constitutional Declaration in March 2011 (after input
from a popular referendum) that replaced the 1971 Constitution
and revised its emergency provisions.55 As under the prior
constitution, the Constitutional Declaration gives the president
authority to declare a state of emergency, though he or she must
first consult the cabinet.56 The Declaration also provides that the
state of emergency must be approved by the legislature within
seven days and that it is limited to a period of six months, after
which it can only be extended in a national referendum.57

The 1971 Constitution also contained several provisions that
gave the president extraordinary powers to deal with exigent
situations, but which did not require the declaration of a state of
emergency. Article 74 authorized the president to take “urgent
measures” necessary to deal with threats to national unity, the
safety of the nation, or the constitutional role of state institutions, after consulting the prime minister and the speakers of
both houses of the legislature.45 Article 74 required the president to hold a public referendum on any such actions within 60
days.46 Similarly, Article 108 of the 1971 Constitution provided
that the legislature could delegate power to the president to enact
decrees having the force of law, “in times of necessity,” subject
to the approval of the prime minister.47

Despite frequent exhortations against the state of emergency and the 1958 emergency law by Egyptian demonstrators, 58 human rights organizations,59 and foreign governments,60 the SCAF left both, at least partially, in place after
Mubarak’s resignation. In September 2011, the SCAF issued
a decree that expanded the state of emergency, approved by
the People’s Assembly to cover terrorism and drug trafficking
in March 2010, to a number of additional threats, including
internal disturbances, public system disruption and its financing, ownership and trading of weapons, bullying, obstructions
to transportation, broadcasting false information, and spreading
rumors.61 However, in January 2012, the SCAF lifted the state
of emergency for all offenses other than “thuggery,” a term the

Historically, the emergency clause in Article 148 has been
the most important. In fact, Egypt was in a nearly continuous
state of emergency from 1967 through May of this year. In
1967, the first president of the Egyptian Republic, Gamel Abd
Al-Nasser, declared a state of emergency during
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.48 It was briefly lifted
by Nasser’s successor, Anwar Al-Sadat, but was
reinstated by Mubarak after Sadat’s assassination in October 1981.49 The state of emergency
was repeatedly renewed by the legislature, most
recently in May 2010. 50
Human rights watch groups recorded systematic
human rights abuses by Mubarak’s government,
under the guise of emergency measures.51 Not
surprisingly, lifting of the state of emergency
and revocation of the 1958 Emergency Law were
among the demands of anti-government protesters that ultimately brought about the fall of the
Mubarak regime.52
Following Mubarak’s resignation in February
2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(“SCAF”) assumed control of the country. 53 The
SCAF suspended the 1971 Constitution, leaving
the state of emergency in place;54 however, it

Photo courtesy of Jonathan Rashad.
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SCAF left undefined,62 and in May it let the state of emergency
completely expire for the first time in over 30 years.63

not given explicit authority to do so. While the existence of a
de facto single-party state may have made the creation of
a meaningful check on the executive impossible,70 explicit
constitutional authority for the judiciary to review executive
emergency actions would have been the most likely to succeed.

Diagnosis of Egypt’s Prior Emergency Laws
In diagnosing Egypt’s emergency powers, the typical division
of powers over neo-Roman states of emergency discussed
earlier should be kept in mind. Under this framework, Egypt’s
emergency laws, both under the 1971 Constitution and the 2011
Constitutional Declaration do not appear terribly problematic.
One notable deficiency in the 1971 Constitution (which has been
modified in the Constitutional Declaration) is the absence of a
specified time limit for states of emergency. Another is the lack
of an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the judiciary to review executive emergency actions. Unsurprisingly, the Egyptian Supreme
Constitutional Court, since its creation, largely declined to review
the executive’s exercise of emergency powers by upholding
the president’s authority to prosecute offenses related to the
state of emergency in Emergency State Security Courts, which
were presided over by a mixed
panel of judges and military
officers and did not provide a
right of appeal.64
In addition, as mentioned,
many countries’ constitutions
specify that certain fundamental rights may never be
restricted, even during states
of emergency. Neither Egypt’s
1971 Constitution nor its 2011
Constitutional Declaration
specify non-derogable rights,
and reports have shown that
the Egyptian government
systematically violated rights
regarded as non-derogable
under international law, such
as the right to be free from
torture and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or
punishment.65

New Model for Egypt
The emergency law contemplated in this paper will be the
product ofAa new constitution, which is expected to reshape the
balance of power among the three branches of the Egyptian
government.71 In contemplating the best model for Egypt moving forward, it is useful to consider the types of challenges the
country is likely to face in the near future.
Throughout the military-led transition, the role of the SCAF
and the progression of the transition, itself, have been ardently
contested in street protests, which have, on a number of occasions, escalated into violent confrontation between protesters
and security forces, resulting
in scores of deaths.72 In addition to the danger of rioting
sparked by further protesting, the most cited threats
to the new constitutional
order include terrorism, drug
trafficking, and sectarian
violence.

“… Egypt’s prior emergency
powers suffered from the
absence of a meaningful check
on the decision to declare,
extend, and/or terminate the
state of emergency, the most
used emergency power in the
1971 Constitution.”

Terrorism has historically
been regarded as a serious threat
within Egypt, as is evidenced
by the 2007 Amendment to the
1971 Constitution, authorizing
the legislature to restrict fundamental rights in measures
designed to combat terrorism.73
Terrorism was also cited, along
with drug trafficking, as one
of the reasons for the state of
emergency renewal in 2010,74
and it was included in the list
of reasons for the SCAF’s
state of emergency degree in September 2011.75 In addition,
since former President Mubarak resigned in February 2011, several terrorist attacks were launched in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula,
most of which were directed at the Sinai gas pipeline.76

However, the standard neo-Roman emergency law discussed
above is designed to work in a republic that is based on the separation of powers; whereas, since the founding of the Egyptian
Republic in 1953,66 power has historically been concentrated in
the executive branch.67 In fact, prior to Mubarak’s resignation
in 2011, Egypt was widely regarded as a de facto single-party
state, with the executive controlling access to the legislature and
judiciary.68 However, while it had limited room to maneuver, the
judiciary, in particular the Supreme Constitutional Court, has
been able to exercise a significant degree of independence, and
has, at times, served as a constitutional check on the executive.69

The third often cited danger is sectarian violence between
Muslims (roughly 90% of the population) and Christians
(roughly 10%),77 which has increased in recent years,78 and
which some fear could intensify in the future.79 Egypt may also
have to deal with urban rioting, along the lines of clashes that
occurred in February of this year in a Port Said soccer stadium,
in which more than 70 people were killed, and which were
followed by several days of rioting in Cairo.80

Given these institutional characteristics, in particular the
legislature’s weakness, it becomes apparent that Egypt’s prior
emergency powers suffered from the absence of a meaningful
check on the decision to declare, extend, and/or terminate the
state of emergency, the most used emergency power in the 1971
Constitution. They also suffered to the extent that the judiciary,
the branch best placed to serve as a check on the executive, was

Professor Victor V. Ramraj, a noted scholar on emergency
powers, observes that nascent democracies must work to channel
political disagreements into political processes and institutions in a way that makes the resolution of such disputes seem
legitimate to the disputing parties.81 He notes that developing
13
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above, counsels against relying on the legislature to check
the executive’s emergency actions and for giving the Supreme
Constitutional Court a significant role. However, scholars such
as Posner and Vermeule counsel against judicial review of
emergency actions, on the grounds that judges are ill-equipped
to gather information and make judgments about what national
security requires,85 which counsels against relying on the
Supreme Constitutional Court as the primary or exclusive check
on the executive.

democracies are likely to confront violent opposition during this
channeling process and argues that, though emergency powers,
by their nature, entail derogation from constitutional rights and
procedures, their proper use can help governments demonstrate
their commitment to constitutional checks and the rule of law.82
In Egypt’s case, Ramraj’s advice counsels for a system of
emergency powers that sufficiently enables the government to
deal with serious threats to its legitimacy while visibly limiting
its actions and providing accountability. Along these lines, it
would be beneficial for Egypt’s new emergency powers to look
significantly different from the old ones in order to signal a
change in the government’s approach to dealing with emergencies,
especially given the extent of opposition expressed to the previous
regime’s use of emergency powers, both before, during, and after
the protests that forced Mubarak to resign in early 2011.

It is also useful to note the use of popular referenda to check
the Egyptian president’s emergency actions, both in Article 74 of
the 1971 Constitution and the emergency provision of the 2011
Constitutional Declaration. While, to the author’s knowledge,
the provisions that require popular approval have never been
used, they suggest that the Egyptian people may be well placed
to serve as an effective check on the executive branch, given the
right circumstances.

Given the desirability of such limits and the relatively
immature state of democracy and demonstrated commitment to
the rule of law in Egypt, it seems most appropriate that Egypt
include a neo-Roman emergency law, which spells out permissible emergency actions, and procedures to be followed to activate
them, before an emergency is declared. While this model risks
overuse if it lacks appropriate safeguards, it seems more appropriate than either a pure legality or extra-legal measures model,
both of which require internalization of a system of constitutional limits on government action.

Nonetheless, there are a number of drawbacks to relying on
referenda, including cost and time concerns and the history of
sectarian violence in Egypt, which counsels against relying too
heavily on a popular check to protect minority rights during an
emergency. The possibility of a sectarian emergency also counsels against overreliance on the legislature as a check, especially
given the fact that self-identifying Islamists controlled a majority
of seats in the country’s first post-Mubarak parliament (which has
since been dissolved).86 Altogether, the possibility of a sectarian
emergency also counsels for a role for a counter-majoritarian
institution, namely, the Supreme Constitutional Court.

However, Egypt’s history with long-term states of emergency
during which human rights abuses were systematically committed
also counsels for retaining a form of exceptional powers for the
president in the new constitution. Mubarak’s successors may
have strong political reasons not to declare states of emergency,
even if faced with situations that call for extraordinary measures.
Such was the case in Indonesia, where, as in Egypt, massive
street demonstrations caused a long-serving authoritarian president to resign and ushered in a transition to a democratic form of
government.83 President Habibie, the first Indonesian president
after the transition, refused the military’s request for a declaration of martial law in Indonesia’s Aceh region because of the
history of systematic human rights abuses committed there.84
As such, it would be beneficial to provide the Egyptian president
with another option for taking immediate action in response to
an emergency situation, without having to officially declare a
state of emergency, provided that the alternative option also has
political and judicial checks.

Along these lines, some have expressed concern that Egypt
is on the way to becoming a single-party state once again,
this time with power concentrated in the hands of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, which controlled
nearly a majority of seats in the country’s first post-Mubarak
parliament and now occupies the presidency.87 If this scenario
does come to pass, it may be impossible to create meaningful
checks on the executive’s use of emergency powers, given that
the ruling party in a single-party state, by its nature, controls
access to the governmental institutions that could serve as a
check. This paper proposes a model that is most likely to succeed,
keeping in mind that its suggestions may be of limited effectiveness should a single-party system emerge again.

Proposal

Finally, the competencies of different branches of government
should be kept in mind, both in regards to Egypt, specifically,
and more generally. Egypt’s institutional history, as discussed

This paper proposes that Egypt adopt two types of emergency
powers in its new constitution: one based on the neo-Roman
model, with a formal declaration of emergency and prescribed

Egypt’s constitution…should categorically prohibit
the restriction of rights deemed non-derogable under
international law, including the right to be free from torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
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emergency measures that may restrict ordinary constitutional
norms, and the other largely based on the legality model, allowing
the executive to take actions outside the normal constitutional procedure in the face of an emergency situation without declaring
a state of emergency, provided that such actions are subject to
immediate ratification by the legislature and judicial review for
compliance with ordinary constitutional norms.

referendum), is well placed to serve as the first check on the
president’s invocation of emergency powers. The initial state of
emergency should terminate after three months, unless renewed.
While not all countries explicitly limit the duration of an initial
state of emergency, many, such as South Africa and Turkey, limit
it a period of 21 days95 and six months, 96 respectively.97 This
paper recommends an initial duration of three months, given
Egypt’s history with
extended states of
emergency, but keeping in mind the desirability of giving the
executive flexibility
to act.

State of
Emergency
Egypt’s constitution should authorize
the declaration of a
state of emergency,
in the event of a
threat to the constitutional order that
cannot be managed
through the ordinary
constitutional process, during which
constitutional rights
may be temporarily
restricted. However, Photo courtesy of Jonathan Rashad.
it should categorically prohibit the restriction of rights deemed non-derogable
under international law,88 including the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Extension and
termination of the
state of emergency
After the initial
three months, the
president should be
able to request further extension of the
state of emergency.
Renewal in threemonth intervals, a period also used by South Africa,98 is recommended, again, as a middle ground between the desire for
both time limitation and preserving flexibility of action.99 The
first renewal should be by a simple majority of the legislature,
given that legislatures, in general, have relative competence in
serving as a check on executives’ use of emergency powers.
However, given Egypt’s institutional history, the second renewal
should require approval by the Supreme Constitutional Court,
which should be given jurisdiction to determine whether the
factual conditions for a state of emergency continue to exist. The
Supreme Constitutional Court, which, as noted, has a history of
serving as a check on Egypt’s executive branch, will also serve
as a counter-majoritarian check that will help to protect rights of
minorities during emergencies.

The new constitution should also provide for both civil and
military states of emergency, as do French89 and Turkish law.90 The
option for a military emergency is desirable, especially given the current weakness of the Egyptian police force, due in part to its violent
response to anti-government protests that brought about
Mubarak’s resignation.91 The measures that may be used in
response to an emergency situation should, pursuant to the
neo-Roman model, be specified, either in the constitution, or
in new supplementary legislation that would displace the 1958
Emergency Law. Given Egypt’s history, it may be beneficial to
include in the legislation a provision regarding when security
officials are authorized to fire on protesters, as does Turkish
law.92 The prescription of emergency powers will serve both
to limit the restriction of constitutional rights and to provide
a guideline by which actions actually taken can be evaluated.
Should additional authorities be required during the state of
emergency, supplementary legislation would have to be promulgated by the legislature, using the normal legislative process.

Also keeping in mind the role of constitutional referenda in
Egypt, the third and all subsequent extensions should require
approval of the people in a referendum. While referenda may be
costly, they are not novel in Egypt, and they would help to ensure
that the president is accountable to the people in his or her use of
emergency powers. The fact that the second extension requires
the approval of the Supreme Constitutional Court also ensures
that the people will have available to them a judicial determination that the state of emergency was appropriate before they are
called on to vote to extend it.

All three branches of government, and the population
at large, should be given a role in managing states of emergency.
A breakdown of the recommended division follows.

Oversight of emergency actions

Declaring states of emergency

Egypt’s constitution and supplementary emergency legislation should explicitly provide a right of action and a right of
compensation for actions taken in violation of the prescribed
emergency measures and constitutional guarantees of nonderogable rights.100 Such provisions would ensure that, while the
president may authorize actions consistent with the extraordinary

The power to declare a state of emergency should be given
to the president.93 The state of emergency should require the
approval of a simple majority of the legislature within fourteen
days.94 The legislature, as a political branch that is likely to
have access to information about existing threats to the nation
and can be convened relatively easily (compared to a national
15
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powers granted in emergency legislation, his or her actions are
limited and can be challenged in a court of law. In addition, the
constitution should provide that, should the executive branch
choose to try defendants in military or security courts, convicted defendants have a right
to appeal their convictions in an
ordinary civilian court. Such a
provision (similar to the right of
habeas corpus in the American
Constitution101) would balance
preserving the president’s ability
to use military or security courts,
to the extent they may be necessary, with defendants’ internationally recognized human right
to a fair trial before an impartial
tribunal.102

Exceptional Powers of
the President

Egypt’s “exceptional powers” should be modeled on Indonesia’s
exigency power, which allows the president to issue decrees
having the force of law, which are immediately submitted to
the legislature for ratification.106 The use of exceptional powers should, as in Indonesia, be
subject to judicial review.107
However, Egypt’s new constitution should explicitly provide
for judicial review of the exceptional powers, and it should
explicitly state that the exercise
of such powers does not permit the president to derogate
constitutional rights. As such,
the exceptional powers would
give the president a degree of
flexibility to act in response to
an emergency situation, without triggering an official state
of emergency, while giving the
judiciary jurisdiction to protect
the constitutional rights of citizens. Presumably, the judiciary
would have discretion to defer
to the political branches, per
Posner and Vermeule.

… this paper proposed an
innovative emergency law
model that would allow the
newly constituted Egyptian
state to combat serious
threats to its vitality while
maintaining a commitment to
the rule of law.

A number of countries’ constitutions, in addition to authorizing states of emergency,
authorize the chief executive
to take extraordinary actions,
in certain situations, without
declaring a state of emergency. Article 16 of the French
Constitution authorizes the president to take any measures he or
she deems necessary, in the event of a “serious and immediate
threat” to the nation, its institutions, or its international commitments. After thirty days, such measures are reviewable by
the Conseil Constitutionnel.103 As referenced above, Indonesia’s
constitution provides an exigency power for the president that
may be exercised outside a state of emergency, and which is, at
least partially, judicially reviewable.104 In addition, Article 74 of
the 1971 Egyptian Constitution authorized the president to take
“urgent measures” in the event of “[danger threatening] national
unity or the safety of the motherland or [obstructing] the constitutional role of the state institutions.”105

onclusion

The process of drafting a new democratic constitution with
a more robust separation
of powers is currently underway in
C
Egypt. Since before the massive protests that brought about
former President Mubarak’s resignation in February of last
year, pro-democracy activists have been calling for changes
to the emergency powers that gave the Egyptian president
extensive authority to restrict constitutional rights. Keeping in
mind Egypt’s experience with states of emergency in the past
and emergencies the country may face in the future, this paper
proposed an innovative emergency law model that would allow
the newly constituted Egyptian state to combat serious threats to
its vitality while maintaining a commitment to the rule of law.

Egypt’s history with abuse of emergency powers counsels
for providing an alternative to a neo-Roman state of emergency.
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